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Abstract. This paper develops an evolutionary trade network game (TNG) that combines evolutionary game
play with endogenous partner selection. Successive generations of resource-constrained buyers and sellers
choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payo®s. Trade partner selection
takes place in accordance with a modi¯ed Gale-Shapley matching mechanism, and trades are implemented
using trade strategies evolved via a standardly speci¯ed genetic algorithm. The trade partnerships resulting
from the matching mechanism are shown to be core stable and Pareto optimal in each successive trade
cycle. Nevertheless, computer experiments suggest that these static optimality properties may be inadequate
measures of optimality from an evolutionary perspective.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game studies typically focus on the optimality properties of strategy con¯gurations when
agents are matched randomly or deterministically by some extraneous device. The optimality properties
of the matching mechanism per se are generally not considered ([12], [15]). In contrast, optimal search
studies focus on the optimality properties of preference-based agent matching mechanisms, but generally
these studies are set in static contexts [19]. Since actual social interactions are often characterized both by
evolutionary dynamics and by preference-based partner selection, studying both aspects together seems a
logical and interesting next step to take.
This issue is addressed in Stanley et al. [21]. The standard evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma
(IPD) is extended to an evolutionary IPD with choice and refusal (IPD/CR) by allowing players to choose
and refuse game partners in each iteration on the basis of continually updated expected payo®s.2
The introduction of choice and refusal fundamentally alters the way in which players interact in the IPD
and the characteristics that result in high payo® scores. Choice allows players to increase their chances of
encountering other cooperative players, and refusal gives players a way to protect themselves from defections
without having to defect themselves. The ostracism of defectors occurs endogenously as an increasing
number of players individually refuse the defectors' game o®ers. Nevertheless, choice and refusal also permit
opportunistic players to home in quickly on exploitable players and form parasitic relationships.
The computer experiments reported in [21] and in the subsequent studies by Ashlock et al. [1], Smucker et
al. [20], and Hauk [9] indicate that the emergence of mutual cooperation in the standard evolutionary IPD is
accelerated by the introduction of choice and refusal of partners. The underlying player interaction patterns
induced by choice and refusal can be complex and highly path dependent, however, even when expressed
play behavior is largely cooperative. Consequently, it has proved di±cult to characterize the mapping from
parameter con¯gurations to evolutionary outcomes for the IPD/CR.
1To appear in H. Amman et al. (eds.), Advances in Computational Economics, Kluwer Book Series, 1997. This paper is
based on Tesfatsion [23]. An abbreviated version of this paper appears in the Proceedings Volume of the Fifth Annual Conference
on Evolutionary Programming. The author is grateful to D. Fogel, M. Smucker, and N. Vriend for helpful comments.
2Other game theory studies focusing on the endogenous determination of player interaction patterns, e.g., by permitting
avoidance of unwanted interactions, endogenously determined probabilities of interaction, or evolution of interaction lengths,
include Fogel [6], Guriev and Shakhova [8], Hirshleifer and Rasmusen [10], Kitcher [13], Mailath et al. [14], and Orbell and
Dawes [18]. There is also a growing body of work by economists on multi-agent systems with endogenous interactions. See, for
example, Brock and Durlauf [2], De Vany [3], Duong [4], Durlauf [5], Ionnides [11], and Vriend [24].
1A potentially useful way to proceed, then, is to focus on more concrete settings which impose problem-
speci¯c constraints on agent interactions. In Tesfatsion [23] an evolutionary trade network game (TNG) is
proposed for studying the interplay between evolutionary dynamics and endogenous preference-based partner
selection under alternatively speci¯ed market structures.
The player set for the TNG consists of buyer and seller tradebots who choose and refuse trade partners
on the basis of continuously updated expected payo®s. Buyers make trade o®ers to preferred sellers which
the sellers either accept or refuse. A trade o®er is an invitation to engage in a risky trade modelled as
a two-player game. Each buyer and seller initially associates a prior expected payo® with each potential
trade partner and adopts a random strategy for use in subsequent trades. The buyers and sellers then enter
into a trade cycle loop consisting of successive rounds of partner matching, resource-constrained trading,
and updating of expected payo®s. At the end of the trade cycle loop the buyers and sellers enter into
an evolutionary step in which trade strategies successful in past trades are retained while trade strategies
unsuccessful in past trades are replaced with variants of more successful strategies. A new trade cycle loop
then commences.
The modular form of the TNG facilitates experimentation with alternative speci¯cations for trade partner
matching, trading, expectation updating, and trade strategy evolution. This paper presents preliminary
experimental results obtained for the particular TNG module speci¯cations outlined in Tesfatsion [23] using
the C++ trade platform developed in McFadzean and Tesfatsion [17]. As will be clari¯ed below, trade
partners are determined in accordance with a deferred choice and refusal (DCR) mechanism, a modi¯ed
Gale-Shapley matching mechanism [7] that retains the static optimality properties of the original Gale-
Shapley mechanism. Expected payo®s are updated by means of a simple learning algorithm that yields
consistent estimates. A trade is modelled as a prisoner's dilemma game, and trade (IPD) strategies are
evolved by means of a standardly speci¯ed genetic algorithm.
Two types of markets are considered: buyer-seller markets; and two-sided markets. In the buyer-seller
market, each tradebot is both a buyer and a seller in the sense that he can both make and receive trade
o®ers. In the two-sided market, the set of buyers (tradebots who can make o®ers) is disjoint from the set of
sellers (tradebots who can receive o®ers). For each type of market, attention is focused on the average ¯tness
scores achieved by the tradebots as the market evolves and on the degree to which the tradebots engage in
mutually cooperative behavior.
One interesting ¯nding concerns the high transactions costs that agents can su®er under Gale-Shapley
type matching mechanisms due to large numbers of refused o®ers. Speci¯cally, for certain parameter spec-
i¯cations, the negative refusal payo®s accumulated under the DCR mechanism in both buyer-seller and
two-sided markets can result in lower average ¯tness scores for the tradebots relative to other less sophis-
ticated matching mechanisms. Another interesting ¯nding concerns the evolutionary e®ects of the bias of
Gale-Shapley type matching mechanisms in favor of those who actively make o®ers. Under the DCR mech-
anism, which inherits this bias, buyers in two-sided markets with relatively large seller acceptance quotas
appear to be able to form long-term parasitic relations with sellers that reduce seller ¯tnesses relative to
buyer ¯tnesses and hinder the emergence of mutually cooperative behavior. Overall, these experimental
¯ndings suggest that the conventional optimality properties used to evaluate agent matching mechanisms in
static market contexts may be inadequate measures of optimality from an evolutionary perspective.
The TNG module speci¯cations are detailed in Section 2. Static optimality properties of the DCR
matching mechanism are developed in Section 3, and the evolutionary implications of the DCR matching
mechanism are investigated in Section 4 by means of computer experiments. Concluding comments are given
in Section 5.
2 The TNG Model
The set of players for the TNG is the union V = B [S of a nonempty subset B of buyer tradebots who can
submit trade o®ers and a nonempty subset S of seller tradebots who can receive trade o®ers, where B and S






Table 1. Payo® Matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
and retail store owners, workers and employers, borrowers and lenders, or auction traders.
Each generation of tradebots participates in a trade cycle loop consisting of a ¯xed number of trade
cycles. In each trade cycle, each buyer m can submit up to Om trade o®ers to sellers, and each seller n can
accept up to An trade o®ers from buyers, where Om and An are strictly positive. One interpretation for the
buyer o®er quota Om is that buyer m has a limited amount of resources (credit, labor time, collateral,...) to
trade in exchange for other items, and one interpretation for the seller acceptance quota An is that seller n
has a limited amount of items (goods, job openings, loans,...) to provide.
The tradebots determine their submission, acceptance, and refusal of trade o®ers in each trade cycle
using a modifed version of the well-known Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism [7]. This modi¯ed
mechanism, hereafter referred to as the deferred choice and refusal (DCR) mechanism, is discussed more
carefully in Section 3 below. During the DCR matching process, any tradebot that has a trade o®er refused
is immediately penalized by receipt of a negative refusal payo® , R; the tradebot who does the refusing is
not penalized. If a tradebot neither submits nor accepts any trade o®ers during this matching process, he
receives a wall°ower payo®, W.
A trade o®er is an o®er by a buyer to a seller to participate in a risky trade modelled as a prisoner's
dilemma (PD) game. For example, the trade may involve the exchange of a good or service of a certain
promised quality in return for a loan or wage contract entailing various payment obligations. A buyer
participating in a trade may either cooperate (ful¯ll his trade obligations) or defect (renege on his trade
obligations), and similarly for a seller. The range of possible payo®s is the same for each trade in each trade
cycle: namely, L (the sucker payo®) is the lowest possible payo®, received by a cooperative tradebot whose
trade partner defects; D is the payo® received by a defecting tradebot whose trade partner also defects; C is
the payo® received by a cooperative tradebot whose trade partner also cooperates; and H (the temptation
payo®) is the highest possible payo®, received by a defecting tradebot whose trade partner cooperates. More
precisely, the payo®s are assumed to satisfy L < D < 0 < C < H; with (L + H)=2 < C. The payo® matrix
for the PD game is depicted in Table 1.
The trade behavior of each tradebot, whether he is a pure buyer in V ¡ S, a buyer-seller in B \ S, or
a pure seller in V ¡ B, is characterized by a ¯nite-memory pure strategy for playing a PD game with an
arbitrary partner an inde¯nite number of times, hereafter referred to as a trade strategy. Each tradebot
thus has a distinct trading personality even if he engages in both buying and selling activities. No tradebot
knows any other tradebot's strategy a priori; he can only learn about it by engaging the other tradebot in
repeated trades and observing the payo® history that ensues. Moreover, each tradebot's choice of an action
in a current trade with a potential trade partner is determined entirely on the basis of the payo®s obtained
in past trades with this same partner.
At the beginning of the initial trade cycle loop, before any actual trades have taken place, each tradebot v
associates an exogenously given prior expected payo® U0
v(k) with each potential trade partner k. Throughout
each trade cycle, tradebot v then uses a simple variable-gain criterion ¯lter [22] to update his current expected
payo®s on the basis of the new payo®s he obtains from interactions with his potential trade partners. In
particular, if tradebot v receives a payo® P from an interaction with a potential trade partner k, then v
forms an updated expected payo® for k by taking a convex combination of this new payo® P and his previous
3int main () f
tngInit() ; // Construct initial tradebots
// with prior expected payo®s.
For (G = 0,...,GMAX-1) f // Enter the generation loop.
For (I = 0,...,IMAX-1) f // Enter the trade cycle loop.
MatchTraders(); // Determine trade partners,
// given expected payo®s,
// and record refusal and
// wall°ower payo®s.
Trade(); // Implement trades and
// record trade payo®s.
UpdateExp(); // Update expected payo®s
// using newly recorded payo®s.
g
AssessFitness(); // Record ¯tness scores.
If (G < GMAX-1) f




Return 0 ; g
Table 2. TNG Pseudo Code
expected payo® for k, where the inverse of the weight on P is 1 plus tradebot v's current payo® count with k.
In this way, tradebot v keeps a running tab on the payo® outcomes of his interactions with k. As explained in
Tesfatsion [23, Section 5], this updating procedure guarantees that the expected payo® tradebot v associates
with k converges to the true average payo® tradebot v attains from interactions with k as the number of
interactions between v and k becomes arbitrarily large.
At the end of a trade cycle loop, the ¯tness score of each tradebot is calculated as the average of all
of the trade, refusal, and wall°ower payo®s he received during this loop. The tradebots then enter into a
genetic step in which the trade strategies used by the elite (the ¯ttest tradebots) are retained while the trade
strategies used by the remaining tradebots are replaced with variants of more successful trade strategies. A
detailed discussion of the ¯nite state machine (FSM) and standardly speci¯ed genetic algorithm (GA) used
in the genetic step to represent and evolve the tradebots' trade strategies can be found in McFadzean and
Tesfatsion [17]. Brie°y, the GA is applied to a population of bit strings that encode the trade strategies
(FSMs) of the tradebots. The GA employs two-point crossover with bit mutation, and parent strategies are
chosen probabilistically in proportion to ¯tness. The particular FSM and GA parameter settings used in all
experiments reported in this paper are detailed in the next section.
At the end of the genetic step the memories of the tradebots are reset to zero, their associated FSMs are
reset to a ¯xed initial state, and their expected payo®s are reset to the prior expected payo® levels. A new
trade cycle loop then commences. Table 2 depicts the overall logical progression of the TNG in pseudo-code.
Before reporting on analytical and simulation ¯ndings regarding the optimality properties of the DCR
matching mechanism, three special cases of the TNG will be sketched to indicate the range of economic
applications it encompasses.
Case 1: A Labor Market Modelled as an Assignment Game with Choice and Refusal
The set B consists of workers and the set S consists of employers, where B and S are disjoint. Each
worker m can make work o®ers to a maximum of Om employers, or he can choose to be unemployed and
receive the known payo® W. Each employer n can hire up to An workers, and employers can refuse work
o®ers. Once matched, a worker and employer engage in work site interactions modelled as a PD game.
This TNG special case extends the usual assignment problem [19] by incorporating subsequent strategic
game play between matched pairs of agents and by having game play iterated over time. Assignment problems
arecommonly used by economists to model job-matching in labor marketsas wellas other economicprocesses,
4but the payo® outcome for each matched pair of agents is usually speci¯ed a priori.
Case 2: A Labor Market with Endogenously Determined Workers and Employers
The subsets B and S coincide, implying that each tradebot can both make and receive trade o®ers. Each
tradebot v can make up to Ov work o®ers to tradebots at other work sites and receive up to Av work o®ers
at his own work site. The degree to which any accepted work o®er results in satisfactory outcomes for the
participant tradebots is determined by subsequent PD game play. Ex post, four pure types of tradebots can
emerge: (1) pure workers, who work at the sites of other tradebots but have no tradebots working for them
at their own sites; (2) pure employers, who have tradebots working for them at their own sites but who do
not work at the sites of other tradebots; (3) unemployed tradebots, who make at least one work o®er to a
tradebot at another site but who end up neither working at other sites nor having tradebots working for
them at their own sites; and (4) inactive (out of the work force) tradebots, who neither make nor accept any
work o®ers.
Case 3: Intermediation with Choice and Refusal
The buyer subset B and the seller subset S overlap but do not coincide. The pure buyers in V ¡ S are
the depositors (lenders), the buyer-sellers in B \ S are the intermediaries (banks), and the pure sellers in
V ¡ B are the capital investors (borrowers). The depositors o®er funds to the intermediaries in return for
deposit accounts, and the intermediaries o®er loan contracts to the capital investors in return for a share
of earnings. The degree to which accepted o®ers are satisfactorily ful¯lled is determined by subsequent PD
game play.
3 Determination of TNG Trade Partners
The original Gale-Shapley matching mechanism [7] was designed for two-sided markets in which one subset
of agents makes o®ers to a second disjoint subset of agents, with all o®er quotas equal to 1. As detailed in
Roth and Sotomayor [19], this mechanism continues to be the subject of numerous theoretical studies, and it
has found practical application as well|most notably to the labor market for medical interns and residents.
The DCR mechanism extends the original Gale-Shapley mechanism to the more general TNG context
in which the subsets of buyers (makers of o®ers) and sellers (receivers of o®ers) can be coincident, overlap-
ping, or disjoint, with arbitrarily speci¯ed o®er and acceptance quotas. The TNG tradebots use the DCR
mechanism to determine their submission, acceptance, and refusal of trade o®ers conditional on their current
preference rankings over potential trade partners. This section ¯rst provides a more careful description of
DCR mechanism. It is then shown that the DCR mechanism possesses the usual static optimality proper-
ties associated with Gale-Shapley type matching mechanisms: namely, core stability, and Pareto optimality
for the subset of agents who actively make o®ers. Although trades in the TNG are currently modelled as
prisoner's dilemma games, neither the de¯nition of the DCR mechanism nor its static optimality properties
depend on this speci¯cation.
For any tradebot v in V, let ¿v denote tradebot v's minimum tolerance level, and let Uv(k) denote the
expected payo® that tradebot v currently associates with a potential trade partner k. Tradebot k will be
called tolerable for tradebot v if and only if Uv(k) ¸ ¿v. Also, given any two potential trade partners k0 and
k00, tradebot v will be said to strictly prefer to trade with k0 rather than with k00 if Uv(k0) > Uv(k00) and to
equally prefer trades with k0 and k00 if Uv(k0) = Uv(k00).
The DCR Mechanism In Any Trade Cycle T:
Step 1: Each buyer m submits trade o®ers to a maximum of Om most preferred sellers that he ¯nds tolerable,
with at most one trade o®er going to any one seller. Each seller n then selects up to An most preferred
trade o®ers received from tolerable buyers and places these o®ers on a waiting list. Seller n refuses
all other trade o®ers received in Step 1. Buyers and sellers use random selection to break ties among
equally-preferred trades.
5Step K (K ¸ 2) : If r sellers refused trade o®ers from buyer m in Step K ¡1, then buyer m submits up to
r replacement trade o®ers in Step K to the most preferred and tolerable sellers who have not refused
a trade o®er from him during Steps 1;:::;K ¡ 1. Each seller n then selects up to An most preferred
and tolerable trade o®ers from among both the new trade o®ers he receives in Step K and the trade
o®ers already on his waiting list from Step K ¡ 1, and he refuses the rest. These selected trade o®ers
constitute seller n's waiting list for Step K. Buyers and sellers use random selection to break ties
among tolerable equally-preferred trades.
Final Step K¤: Step K¤ is the ¯nal step if and only if no new trade o®ers are submitted in Step K¤ +1. If
Step K¤ is the ¯nal step, each seller accepts all trade o®ers on his Step K¤ waiting list.
Under the DCR mechanism, two tradebots v and k can engage in zero, one, or two trades with each
other in each trade cycle. Zero trades occur when neither tradebot submits an accepted trade o®er to the
other; one trade occurs when only one of the tradebots submits an accepted trade o®er to the other; and two
trades occur when each tradebot submits an accepted trade o®er to the other. Note that this determination
of trade partners requires the tradebots to pass messages back and forth to each other at event-driven
times, a feature not present in standard economic models. This requirement is easily implemented by an
object-oriented programming language such as C++.
Step K¤ is the last step of the DCR mechanism in trade cycle T if and only if each buyer m either has
had no trade o®er refused in Step K¤, and hence has no desire to submit a new trade o®er in Step K¤ +1,
or is unable to submit a new trade o®er in Step K¤ +1 because each seller that buyer m ¯nds tolerable has
already received a trade o®er from him sometime during Steps 1;:::;K¤. The ¯rst proposition provides an
upper bound for K¤. The proofs for this proposition, and for all subsequent propositions, are detailed in
Tesfatsion [23, Section 4].
PROPOSITION 3.1. Let M denote the number of buyers in the buyer set B, and let N denote the
number of sellers in the seller set S. In each trade cycle T, the DCR mechanism always ends at some Step
K¤ occurring on or before Step MN.
DEFINITION 3.1. A buyer m and seller n will be said to form a match in trade cycle T, denoted by
(m;n), if buyer m is tolerable for seller n, seller n is tolerable for buyer m, and buyer m and seller n engage
in a trade during trade cycle T. A matching outcome for trade cycle T is then any listing of distinct matches
(m;n) for trade cycle T such that each buyer m appears at most Om times in the ¯rst position and each
seller n appears at most An times in the second position. By construction, then, a matching outcome for
trade cycle T is a list of trades that could feasibly take place during this cycle.
Note that thetrades determined in any tradecycle T by theDCR mechanism always constitute a matching
outcome for trade cycle T in the sense of De¯nition 3.1.
DEFINITION 3.2. (cf. Gale and Shapley [7, p. 10]) A matching outcome G for trade cycle T will be
called unstable if the following conditions hold for some buyer m and seller n:
(a) m and n are not matched under G;
(b) m would prefer to be matched with n, in the sense that either there exists a match (m;n0) under G
such that Um(n) > Um(n0), or m is matched with fewer than Om sellers under G and Um(n) ¸ ¿m.
(c) n would prefer to be matched with m, in the sense that either there exists a match (m0;n) under G such
that Un(m) > Un(m0), or n is matched with fewer than An buyers under G and Un(m) ¸ ¿n.
A matching outcome G for trade cycle T will be called (pairwise) stable if no such buyer m and seller n
exist.
Intuitively, given conditions (a), (b), and (c), the buyer m and seller n could block the implementation
of the matching outcome G by agreeing to play each other instead. Roth and Sotomayor [19] are careful to
6di®erentiate between group stable and pairwise stable matching outcomes, whereby the former they mean
a matching outcome that is not blocked by any coalition of agents. In the TNG, each trader is assumed
to have a preference ranking only over pairwise matches with other traders, and this preference ranking
is una®ected by who else might be trading with these potential trade partners. Consequently, a matching
outcome in the TNG is group stable if and only if it is also pairwise stable. Without risk of confusion, then,
the quali¯er \pairwise" will be omitted in all subsequent references to stable matching outcomes.
PROPOSITION 3.2. Any matching outcome generated via the DCR mechanism is stable.
The ¯nal proposition shows that the matching outcome generated by the DCR mechanism in each trade
cycle is a best possible matching outcome from the viewpoint of the buyers, i.e., the tradebots who actively
make o®ers, as long as buyers and sellers have strict preferences over their potential trade partners. The
proof is a generalization of the optimality proof provided in Gale and Shapley [7, Thm. 2, p. 14] for their
college admissions problem with B disjoint from S and o®er quotas Om = 1 for all agents m in B; see also
Roth and Sotomayor [19, Chapter 5].
DEFINITION 3.3. A matching outcome G will be called B-optimal if: (a) G is a stable matching
outcome; and (b) each buyer matched under G is at least as well o® under G as under any other stable
matching outcome.
PROPOSITION 3.3. Suppose each buyer (seller) in some trade cycle T has a strict preference ranking
over the sellers (buyers) he ¯nds tolerable. Then the DCR mechanism yields the unique B-optimal matching
outcome for trade cycle T.
4 TNG Computer Experiments
In the previous section it is shown that the trade partnerships generated via the DCR mechanism exhibit
the usual static optimality properties associated with Gale-Shapley type matching mechanisms. Still to be
determined, however, is the extent to which the DCR mechanism induces a high average payo® for the
tradebots over evolutionary time. In particular, to what extent does the DCR mechanism encourage the
emergence and persistence of mutually cooperative behavior?
Four types of computer experiments are discussed in the present section: (a) buyer-seller market ex-
periments with sellers unconstrained by acceptance quotas; (b) buyer-seller market experiments with seller
acceptance quotas set to 1; (c) two-sided market experiments with sellers unconstrained by acceptance quo-
tas; and (d) two-sided market experiments with seller acceptance quotas set to 1. All experimental ¯ndings
reported below were obtained using TNG, a C++ trade platform developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion
[17] which in turn is supported by the C++ abstract base classes developed by McFadzean [16] for a general
arti¯cial life platform, SimBioSys. These ¯ndings are preliminary in the sense that only average ¯tness scores
are considered. A more thorough understanding of these ¯ndings will require delving more deeply into the
underlying trade networks and the trade strategies that support these trade networks.
For each type of experiment, multiple runs from di®erent initial random seeds are reported. The following
features are set commonly across all of these experimental runs. The wall°ower payo® W is set at 0, the
refusal payo® R is set at ¡0:6, the PD trade payo®s are set at L = ¡1:6, D = ¡0:6, C = 1:4, and
H = 3:4, and each tradebot's minimum tolerance level is set at ¿ = 0. Each tradebot assigns the same prior
expected payo®, U0 = C, to each other tradebot, implying that he is initially indi®erent concerning which
trade partners he interacts with; and each tradebot assigns a negative prior expected payo® to himself, thus
ensuring that he never trades with himself. Each buyer tradebot has an o®er quota of 1, meaning that he
can have at most one trade o®er outstanding to sellers at any given time. The total number of tradebots is
set at 24, and the 16 most ¯t tradebots in each generation are taken to be the elite. The number of trade
cycles in each trade cycle loop is set at 150, and the number of generations is set at 50.
Each trade strategy is represented by a 16-state FSM with a ¯xed initial state and with memory 1. At
the beginning of the ¯rst trade cycle loop, a bit string coding for each FSM is randomly generated. At
7the end of each trade cycle loop, the current population of trade strategies (FSMs coded as bit strings) is
evolved by means of a genetic algorithm employing two-point crossover and bit mutation. The probability
of crossover is set at 1:0 and the probability of a bit mutation is set at 0:005.
4.1 Buyer-Seller Markets
Each tradebot in these experiments was both a buyer and a seller, implying that he could both make and
receive trade o®ers.
In the ¯rst batch of buyer-seller experiments, the acceptance quota of each tradebot was set at 24, the
total number of tradebots. Since o®er quotas in these experiments were set at 1, the tradebots were then
e®ectively unconstrained with regard to the number of trade o®ers they could have on their waiting lists at
any given time.
As a benchmark, experiments were ¯rst run with random partner matching in place of the DCR matching
mechanism. Random partner matching was e®ected by preventing the updating of the prior expected payo®
U0 = C that each tradebot initially assigned to each potential trade partner, so that all tradebots remained
indi®erent concerning their potential trade partners and matching was accomplished by the default mech-
anism of a random draw. Although occasionally the average ¯tness score achieved by the tradebots under
random matching rose to the mutual cooperation level, 1:4, a more typical outcome was a steady decline to
the mutual defection level, ¡0:6; see Fig. 1.3 The size of the refusal payo® is irrelevant for this ¯nding, since
refusals never occur in TNG experiments with random matching and nonbinding acceptance quotas.
When the DCR matching mechanism was then restored, the average ¯tness score achieved by the trade-
bots typically evolved to the mutual cooperation level 1:4; see Fig. 2. These TNG experiments reinforce
the previous IPD/CR ¯ndings of Stanley et al. [21] and Ashlock et al. [1] that a preference-based matching
mechanism tends to accelerate the emergence of mutual cooperation in the IPD when each agent is permitted
both to make and to refuse game o®ers, is unconstrained with regard to the number of received o®ers he can
accept, and is permitted to have at most one o®er outstanding at any given time.
In the second batch of buyer-seller experiments, the acceptance quotas were reduced from 24 to 1. Each
tradebot could thus retain at most one trade o®er on his waiting list at any one time; all other received trade
o®ers had to be refused. Under random partner matching, the typical outcome was again the emergence of
an average ¯tness score close to the mutual defection payo® level, ¡0:6. This same outcome obtained even
when refusal payo®s were omitted from ¯tness scores, implying that refusal payo®s resulting from limited
waiting lists were not a determining factor.
When the DCR matching mechanism was restored, however, the average ¯tness score typically leveled
out at about 1:25 instead of evolving to the mutual cooperation payo® level 1:4, the outcome for the ¯rst
batch of buyer-seller experiments. The explanation for this di®erence appears to lie in the changed nature
of the refusal payo®s.
In the ¯rst batch of buyer-seller experiments, the acceptance quota (24) was large relative to the o®er
quota (1). In these circumstances, tradebots are generally refused by other tradebots only if the latter ¯nd
them to be intolerable because of past defections. Negative refusal payo®s received in response to defections
should rightly count against the ¯tness of the trade strategies generating the defections, for this induces
changes in these strategies in the genetic step that tend to lead to higher future ¯tness scores. In the
second batch of buyer-seller experiments, however, the acceptance quota (1) was much smaller in relation
to the o®er quota (1), implying that many more received trade o®ers had to be refused regardless of their
desirability. In these circumstances, tradebots tend to accumulate large numbers of negative refusal payo®s
purely as a consequence of the relatively small acceptance quota and the nature of the DCR mechanism,
regardless of their trade strategies. Since neither the quotas nor the DCR mechanism are evolved in the
3As previously noted, the initial population of strategies for each TNG experiment was randomly generated and each run
consisted of only 50 generations with interactions between any two players limited to at most 150 separate encounters per
generation. Thus, this evolution of mutual defection is not in con°ict with the evolution of mutual cooperation observed for the
IPD with random or round-robin matching by previous researchers when the initial strategy population was su±ciently seeded
with cooperatively inclined strategies such as Tit-for-Tat or when much longer player interaction lengths were permitted.
8current implementation of the TNG, penalizing the tradebots for these quota and DCR e®ects by including
refusal payo®s in their individual ¯tness scores tends to lower their current average ¯tness score without
inducing a higher average ¯tness score in the future.
As expected, the average ¯tness scores attained by the tradebots in the second batch of buyer-seller
experiments markedly improved when refusal payo®s were removed from the calculation of the tradebots'
individual ¯tness scores; see Fig. 3. Improvement continued to occur when, in addition, the refusal payo®s
were reduced in magnitude from ¡0:60 to ¡0:30; but a further reduction in magnitude to ¡0:06 and then
to 0 resulted in increasingly volatile maximum and minimum average ¯tness scores with no discernible
improvement in average ¯tness scores.
The probable cause of this increased volatility is that tradebots receiving refusals during initial trade
cycles have little incentive to direct their o®ers elsewhere in subsequent trade cycles when the magnitude
of the negative refusal payo® is small. A negative refusal payo® guarantees that the continually updated
expected payo® that a tradebot associates with another tradebot who repeatedly refuses him eventually
falls below 0, the minimum tolerance level, at which point he ceases making o®ers to this other tradebot.
Nevertheless, this learning process is slow when the magnitude of the negative refusal payo® is small, and it
is non-existent when the refusal payo® is simply set to 0.
4.2 Two-Sided Markets
In each two-sided market experiment, the 24 tradebots were evenly divided into 12 pure buyers (makers of
trade o®ers) and 12 pure sellers (receivers of trade o®ers).
In the ¯rst batch of experiments, the acceptance quota of each seller was set to 12. Since the o®er quota
of each buyer was set to 1 in all of these experiments, sellers were thus e®ectively unconstrained regarding
the number of trade o®ers they could have on their waiting lists at any one time. Experiments were ¯rst
run with random partner matching in place of the DCR matching mechanism to obtain a benchmark for
comparison. Interestingly, in contrast to buyer-seller experiments with nonbinding acceptance quotas and
random matching, the average ¯tness score attained by the tradebots tended to fall to a level between ¡0:4
and the wall°ower payo® 0 rather than dropping all the way down to the mutual defection payo® level ¡0:6;
compare Fig. 4 with Fig. 1.
When the DCR matching mechanism was restored, the average ¯tness score of the tradebots typically
evolved to about 1:2, a payo® level markedly below the mutual cooperation level 1:4 obtained in buyer-seller
experiments with nonbinding acceptance quotas and DCR matching. Moreover, the maximum ¯tness score,
the average ¯tness score, and the minimum ¯tness score attained by the successive tradebot generations
persistently deviated from one another. Compare Fig. 5 with Fig. 2.
As seen in Proposition 3.3, the DCR mechanism is only guaranteed to be Pareto optimal for buyers,
that is, for the active makers of trade o®ers. The e®ects of this bias on average ¯tness scores is hidden in
buyer-seller markets, where each tradebot is both a buyer and a seller. However, for two-sided markets with
buyer o®er quotas set equal to 1 and with nonbinding seller acceptance quotas, the DCR mechanism appears
to result in a \separating equilibrium" in which the buyers are generally achieving high ¯tness scores and
the sellers are generally achieving low ¯tness scores. In particular, the extreme pickiness of buyers combined
with the acceptance by sellers of all tolerable received trade o®ers appears to allow buyers to form long-
run parasitic relations with sellers, i.e., relations characterized by successful defections within the limits
permitted by the sellers' 0 minimum tolerance levels.
In the second batch of two-sided market experiments, the seller acceptance quotas were decreased from
12 to 1. Thus, instead of accepting all tolerable received trade o®ers, the sellers now accepted at most one
received trade o®er per trade cycle.
When benchmark experiments were ¯rst run with random partner matching in place of the DCR mecha-
nism, the typical outcome was the emergence of an average attained ¯tness score close to the mutual defection
payo®, ¡0:6. This result obtained whether or not refusal payo®s were counted in the calculation of individual
¯tness scores. When the DCR matching mechanism was then restored, with refusal payo®s counted in the
calculation of individual ¯tness scores, the accumulation of refusal payo®s tended to result in an average
9attained ¯tness score that was markedly below the mutual cooperation payo® level. When refusal payo®s
were then omitted from the calculation of individual ¯tness scores, the average attained ¯tness score tended
to evolve to the mutual cooperation level and to be close to the maximum attained ¯tness scores; see Fig. 6.
Given the structuring of the two-sided market experiments currently under discussion, with equal numbers
of buyers and sellers, common acceptance and o®er quotas, and tradebots who are initially indi®erent among
their potential trade partners, the buyer o®er quota roughly predicts the number of trade o®ers that each
seller will receive in the initial few trade cycles. The larger this number is, the more chance there is that
mutually cooperative matches between buyers and sellers will be quickly discovered. On the other hand,
if the seller acceptance quota is small relative to the buyer o®er quota, then many buyers will accumulate
negative refusal payo®s unrelated to the nature of their trade strategies; and if the seller acceptance quota
is large relative to the buyer o®er quota, opportunistic buyers have a greater chance to seek out and exploit
sellers within the limits allowed by their minimum tolerance levels. Either circumstance could slow or even
prevent the sustained emergence of mutually cooperative behavior.
It might therefore be conjectured that mutually cooperative behavior will best be induced in the current
experimental setting when the seller acceptance quota and the buyer o®er quota are equal and su±ciently
large. Indeed, this turns out to be the case. In various two-sided market experiments with 12 pure buyers,
12 pure sellers, and equal seller and buyer quotas ranging from 3 to 12, the average ¯tness score attained
by the tradebots tended to evolve to the mutual cooperation payo® level and to be close to the maximum
attained ¯tness score even when refusal payo®s were included in the calculation of individual ¯tness scores.
5 Concluding Remarks
As seen in Section 3, the DCR mechanism inherits the usual static optimality properties associated with Gale-
Shapley type matching mechanisms: namely, core stability, and Pareto optimality for the subset of agents
who actively make o®ers. However, the TNG context also permits an examination of the DCR mechanism's
optimality properties over evolutionary time; and the computer experiments reported in Section 4 suggest
that the DCR mechanism has at least two potential problems from this evolutionary perspective.
First, if seller acceptance quotas are small relative to buyer o®er quotas, the DCR mechanism tends
to impose heavy transactions costs on buyers in the form of accumulated negative refusal payo®s that are
unrelated to the social desirability of their trade strategies. Second, if seller acceptance quotas are large
relative to buyer o®er quotas, the inherent bias of the DCR mechanism in favor of buyers appears to allow
buyers in two-sided markets to parasitize sellers, resulting in an average population ¯tness score that remains
markedly below the mutually cooperative payo® level.
Systematic experimentation is needed to determine the true extent and seriousness of these problems.
For example, the exogenously speci¯ed o®er and acceptance quotas should more realistically be allowed
to change over time to re°ect both changing strategic considerations and changing budget and production
relations. Also, the trade strategies for pure buyers and for pure sellers should be separately evolved since
these tradebots face intrinsically asymmetric choice problems. These modi¯cations may alleviate some of
the di±culties with the DCR mechanism that arose in the Section 4 computer experiments with exogenously
given quotas and pooled trade strategy evolution.
Finally, the mechanism by which trade partners are determined should itself be allowed to evolve over
time along with the quotas and trade strategies. It will be interesting to see how Gale-Shapley type matching
mechanisms fare in these less structured evolutionary contexts.
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12Figure 1: Buyer-seller average ¯tness with random matching and seller quotas equal to 24.
Figure 2: Buyer-seller average ¯tness with DCR matching and seller quotas equal to 24.
13Figure 3: Buyer-seller average ¯tness with DCR matching, seller quotas equal to 1, and refusal payo®s
omitted from ¯tness scores.
Figure 4: Two-sided market average ¯tness with random matching and seller quotas equal to 12.
14Figure 5: Two-sided market average ¯tness with DCR matching and seller quotas equal to 12.
Figure 6: Two-sided market average ¯tness with DCR matching, seller quotas equal to 1, and refusal payo®s
omitted from ¯tness scores.
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